Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

Tamra Anne Chavez v. Dennis M. Chavez : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
B.L. Dart; Dart, Adamson, Donovan, and Hanson; attorney for appellee.
Roger D. Sandack; attorney for apellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Chavez v. Chavez, No. 20000970 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2978

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TAMRA ANNE CHAVEZ,
Petitioner-Appellee,
Court of Appeals No: 20000970CA
vs.
Third District Court No: 974900264DA
DENNIS M. CHAVEZ,
Priority 15
Respondent-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLANT
DENNIS M. CHAVEZ

AN APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL FROM A DECREE OF DIVORCE
ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAYMOND UNO
PRESIDING

B.L. Dart, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee

DART, ADAMSON, DONOVAN
& HANSON
370 East South Temple, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Roger D. Sandack, Esq. (#2856)
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals
DEC
*t^_i_

2 o 2001
^4tlL_

4*-

Pauletlo Stagg

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TAMRA ANNE CHAVEZ,
Petitioner-Appellee,
Court of Appeals No: 20000970CA
vs.
Third District Court No: 974900264DA
DENNIS M. CHAVEZ,
Priority 15
Respondent-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLANT
DENNIS M. CHAVEZ

B.L. Dart, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
DART, ADAMSON, DONOVAN
& HANSON
370 East South Temple, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Roger D. Sandack, Esq. (#2856)
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

OBJECTION TO PET II lONER'S STATEMENT OF CASE

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3

CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

ARGUMENT I. RESPONDENT PROPERLY MARSHALED EVIDENCE

8

ARGUMENT II. PETITIONER ADMITS ERROR!

8

A.

Chavez, Inc. Receivable

8

B.

Disproportionate Allocation Of Marital Assets

10

ARGUMENT III. DISSIPATION HAS NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED

12

ARGUMENT IV. PETITIONER CANNOT JUSTIFY THE TRIAL
COURT'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE PROMISSORY NOTE
AS A MARITAL DEBT

15

ARGUMENT V. A DISPROPORTIONATE DIVISION OF
MARITAL PROPERTY IS NOT JUSTIFIED

17

ARGUMENT VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND
S CORP. TO BE NON-MARITAL PROPERTY
A.

Petitioner's Failure to Marshal Evidence

19
19

VII.

ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED

21

VIII.

CONCLUSION

22

F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.toc.wpd

'I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

CASES
Crockett v. Crockett.
836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
Dunn v. Dunn.
802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

19
11,18

Finlavson v. Finlavson.
874 P.2d 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

15

First Nat'l Bank v. Egbert.
663 P.2d 85 (Utah 1983)

15

Maoris v. Sculptured Software. Inc..
24 P.3d 984 (2001)

16

Morgan v. Morgan.
795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

14

Parker v. Parker.
996 P.2d 565 (2000)

12

Russell v. Thompson Newspapers.
842 P.2d 896 (UT. 1992)

F \USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply brief toe wpd

5

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant ("Respondent") and Appellee ("Petitioner") have presented the issues
for this appeal in their respective briefs. Petitioner's response, however, raises other
issues:
I. Whether Petitioner's admission of error by the trial court should entitle
Respondent to the relief requested; to wit, remand for the purpose of equally allocating
a division of marital property and vacating the trial court's award of attorney's fees.
II. Whether the trial court had sufficient facts to hold that S-Corp. stock was a gift
to Respondent and not marital property.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mr. Chavez seeks the following relief on this appeal:
1. An order vacating and remanding the district court's awards which:
a.

Improperly divided a non-existent note receivable from Chavez,
Inc.;

b.

Improperly ordered Respondent to pay $50,000 to Petitioner for
alleged dissipation of assets;

c.

Improperly awarded attorney's fees to Petitioner without properly
evaluating Respondent's ability to pay;

d.

Improperly awarded alimony in amounts not supported by
evidence;

e.

Improperly divided the marital estate without making sufficient
findings of fact;

f.

Failed to consider or allocate marital debt;

g.

Failed to award Respondent his non-marital property.

2. With respect to Petitioner's cross-appeal, Respondent requests affirmance of
the district court's findings that S-Corp. is not marital property.
OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S STATEMENT OF CASE
Petitioner's Statement of Case has added allegations related to the early stages
of the divorce proceeding which are irrelevant, untrue, and prejudicial, for which
Petitioner should be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
While it is true that Dennis Chavez objected to Tamra's first counsel on the basis
that his firm had earlier represented Chavez, Inc., that issue is not now before the
Court. To the extent that allegation was restated to this Court to support Tamra's
request for attorney's fees, it should be noted that at the time of the filing of the
Complaint, Tamra withdrew some $5,000 from the parties' joint bank account without
the knowledge or authority of Dennis, and she had previously had available to her
approximately $4,500 from another Dean Witter joint account and $3,500 from a
returned Christmas gift to Dennis. (R. 197.) These amounts were in addition to the
monthly support voluntarily provided by Dennis. (R. 890, pp. 447-48.) Tamra could
only account for approximately $2,000 of those cash funds having been paid to her
previous attorney. (R. 889 at pp. 354-56.)
There were several attempts to settle this matter which culminated in a
Settlement Agreement prepared on Tamra's behalf which both parties executed. (R.
104.) But for the interference of Tamra's boyfriend, also a lawyer, that Settlement
F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.wpd
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Agreement would have resolved all issues between Dennis and Tamra. (Transcript R.
889 at pp. 254, 256.)
Petitioner's statement, however, on pages 4 and 5 of her brief, alleging that she
had executed the Settlement Agreement based upon information "which later turned out
to be false" is, once again, an untrue and prejudicial allegation which, while fully
responded to by Dennis in his responding affidavits (R. 193), has never been litigated
before the trial court. Petitioner's citation to the record cites only her own affidavit
submitted in support of her motion to set aside the Settlement Agreement. The trial
court set aside the settlement not on the basis of any alleged improper disclosures, but
solely on the basis that her counsel had not withdrawn, as she had requested, before
she executed the stipulation and property settlement agreement. This statement is just
one of a number of prejudicial, harmful statements designed to mischaracterize Dennis
in an extremely unfavorable light before this Court.
There has never been any demonstration that Dennis provided false information
to Tamra or the Court, as alleged by Petitioner's brief. In fact, Petitioner's brief goes on
to admit: "The issue of false financial information was not addressed." (Petitioner's
Brief at 5.) The factually false premise first cited as truth, then withdrawn, leaves a foul
smell.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The parties now agree that the trial court erred by finding that a $100,000 note
receivable from Chavez, Inc. was included as a marital asset. Knowing that this asset
did not exist, Petitioner's counsel prepared the findings and decree, ensuring that she
F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.wpd
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received her one-half portion of that $100,000 receivable paid now under a different
theory. In doing so, the Petitioner and the trial court both neglected to subtract from
Dennis' share of awarded marital property, not only his $50,000 non-existent asset, but
also the $50,000 judgment which Petitioner claims must be paid.
That $100,000 negative impact upon Dennis Chavez's share of marital assets
and his ability to pay attorney's fees, were not considered by the district court.
Additionally, the trial court failed to make sufficient findings that would justify
more than the presumptive 50% of marital property being awarded to Tamra.
The court likewise failed to consider Dennis' tax obligations in determining that
Dennis had sufficient net income to pay not just alimony and child support, but
substantial amounts for Tamra's remaining attorney's fees and taxes, all of which were
speculative and unsupported by evidence in the record.
Finally, the trial court had sufficient evidence in the record to support its finding
that S-Corp. stock had been gifted to Dennis and was not marital property.
CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The following statements from Appellee's Statement of Facts are either
erroneous, exaggerated, or deceiving for the reasons expressed below:
1. $100,000 Chavez Loan. In Paragraph A on Page 11, dealing with the
issues of the $100,000.00 loan from Chavez, Inc., Petitioner states: "and just prior to
the party's separation, the company paid back the $100,000.00; and it was deposited
into Dennis' savings account with Bank One. (Exhibit 67)" Respondent adamantly
disagrees with this statement:
F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.wpd
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First, this statement appears nowhere in the Memorandum Decision, the
Findings of Fact, the record before this Court, or even the depositions from pretrial
discovery.
In referring to the loan, Dennis testified at trial (page 570 of the Transcript, R.
891):"... it was reimbursed over several years." (Page 640 of the Transcript, R. 891):
"And by the end of 1996 that loan was down to $25,000.00 or had been paid off. One
or the other? Answer: Yes."
Dennis then testified that the loan proceeds had been deposited into the parties'
joint checking account at Dean Witter, not the Bank One account. That Bank One
account was opened in March 1997, three months after filing of the divorce complaint,
with proceeds from Dennis's non-marital, S-Corp. dividends. (Deposition of Dennis
Chavez, p. 87, published at trial, R. 891, p. 624.)1
In Dennis' deposition, a fuller explanation was given: "Thereafter, then you
loaned it to the company in the form of $100,000.00 and thereafter it appears that in
1994 they paid you back $75,000.00 of that." Answer: "I believe so." (Deposition
Transcript, p. 40 -Addendum).
At page 41 of Dennis' deposition, he explained what happened to the proceeds:
At that time, we purchased a home or purchased property in Draper and
built a home. All the cash that was returned from Chavez, Inc., to me
went into the purchase of the property and building of a home and
remains there in equity in the property.

1

See Russell v. Thompson Newspapers. Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 899, fn.3 (UT.
1992) (deposition published at trial available as part of the court record).
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The $80,000.00 account at Bank One referred to as Exhibit 67 was started after
March 1997 and was also discussed in Dennis' deposition at page 87: Question: "And
was that, what was the source of that money?" Answer: "The money that I received
from dividends that I testified earlier that I transferred from Dean Witter." After which
Dennis explains virtually every withdrawal from that account. [Addendum - Dennis
Chavez Depo.]
Clearly, Petitioner's counsel had all of the above information available to him, not
only at the time of Dennis' deposition, but also at the time of trial, and should not now
confuse the reader of this record by insinuating that the money a) had been received
"just prior" to separation, b) has been unaccounted for, or c) that the $80,000.00
account contained the same money as was paid back to Dennis from Chavez, Inc.
2. On page 11 of Tamra's Brief, Paragraph B, Petitioner improperly includes
argument concerning the receipt of other gross dividends from S Company for the years
1997, 1998, and 1999, and then, for the first time anywhere, states that the money "was
likewise unaccounted for."
This is the first time such an innuendo has been raised and is so prejudicial that
it should be summarily stricken from Petitioner's brief. Petitioner cites Transcript 637
for the notion that Dennis failed to account for these monies. Yet on that very page,
when Respondent attempted to answer that very question, he is summarily cut off by
Petitioner's counsel because he is "volunteering information." Dennis' response is:
"You've asked me a question where the money went. I'm trying to give you
information." Then Petitioner's counsel leaves the subject.
F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.wpd
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3. On page 12, Paragraph C of the Petitioner's Statement of Fact, headed
"Promissory Note," Petitioner states that Dennis admitted he did not identify the
promissory note as a marital debt in his Answers to Interrogatories (Transcript 625,
626). That was the reason that Respondent later submitted a letter of clarification after
the close of testimony, with the stipulation of Petitioner's counsel, explaining that, at the
time Petitioner answered the interrogatories, Petitioner believed the promissory note
had been satisfied by the transfer of S Corp. stock to his father, Tony Chavez. Later,
Tony Chavez resubmitted the stock, indicating that he did not want to compromise the
issues of this case or interfere with the divorce proceedings. That clarification was
allowed to be made by stipulation of Petitioner's counsel, and Petitioner's counsel
should not now assert claims contrary to this stipulation. (R. 654-56.) (See attachment
1.)

4. At page 15, paragraph 3, Petitioner responds with regard to the future
dividends of S Corp., "that by next year the distributions could be 75% of earnings
(Transcript 319)." That statement came from Petitioner's counsel's question, not from
the witness, who answered correctly on the very next page stating: "75% of cash flow,
not earnings." (T. 320.) That clarification becomes significant as the court found that
Dennis cannot expect any positive cash flow out of S Company's declared dividends
and, in fact, will experience a negative cash flow because he must pay taxes upon the
phantom income reported but not received. See Finding 10b (R. 732):
The Court further finds that [S Corp.] will not distribute sufficient future
distributions of cash to permit a positive cash flow over the potential taxes
F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.wpd
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to be imposed upon the full distribution of dividends by reason of its
Subchapter S federal tax status. [R. 732.]
See also Finding 11 (R. 736-37).
ARGUMENT I
RESPONDENT PROPERLY MARSHALED EVIDENCE.
Appellee correctly states that the trial court is the appropriate tribunal to weigh
conflicting facts and to apply the law properly to those found facts.
Interestingly enough, however, nowhere does the Petitioner now argue that
Respondent's brief has failed to exhaustively marshal all of the facts which the trial
court could have used to support its findings, findings which Petitioner now admits are
not correct and not supported by the evidence.
ARGUMENT II
PETITIONER ADMITS ERROR!
A.

Chavez. Inc. Receivable

Petitioner now admits that the Chavez, Inc. receivable does not exist!2
Petitioners' admission affects several of the issues raised by Respondent's appeal: (a)
the effect upon the trial court's proposed distribution of marital assets, which still
includes the non-existent $100,000 receivable; (b) the effect upon Dennis' ability to pay
attorney's fees; and (c) the issues related to disproportionate allocation of marital
assets.

2

"Everyone is in agreement that the loan has been repaid." (Petitioner's brief at

24.)
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The trial court found in its Memorandum Decision that, amongst the marital
assets to be divided, was a $100,000 receivable from Chavez, Inc. It divided that
receivable equally to each party. Respondent argued, and Petitioner now agrees, that
no such asset exists.
Petitioner now asserts that Respondent should pay Petitioner's $50,000 share of
this non-existent asset on a dissipation of asset theory. However, Respondent was
also awarded $50,000 of a non-existent asset on his side of the marital asset ledger.
Petitioner now asserts that Respondent is supposed to make payment to Petitioner her
$50,000. Accordingly, Respondent is doubly harmed by the admitted loss of his
$50,000 asset and the new responsibility to pay $50,000 to Petitioner. That creates a
$100,000 negative impact upon the marital assets originally awarded to Dennis by the
trial court's Memorandum Decision.
The trial court, at page 17 of its Memorandum Decision (R. 673) and the
Findings (R. 740), awards Dennis $265,332 of marital assets. Now, however, that
same asset valuation turns into $165,322 for Dennis while Tamra's share of marital
property stays at $354,898, almost $200,000 more than Mr. Chavez.
When the trial court awarded the Petitioner attorney's fees of $38,000, it did so
when it had assumed that it divided the Chavez, Inc. $100,000 receivable equally
between the parties. The trial court had not at that time accepted Petitioner's Proposed
Findings or Decree, so the court could not have considered Dennis' obligation to also
pay a judgment of $50,000 to Petitioner based upon her added theory (now termed
dissipation of assets). Nor could the trial court have considered that the $100,000
F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.wpd
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receivable was non-existent. Likewise, the court could not have properly considered
Respondent's ability to pay a $38,000 attorney fee. These facts alone demonstrate the
trial court's reliance upon an error of fact, and the insufficiency of the evidence
considered to award attorney's fees or distribute an unequal division of marital property.
B.

Disproportionate Allocation Of Marital Assets.

Looking at the effect of this error, and comparing the trial court's Memorandum
Decision to the Decree of Divorce after Petitioner submitted her version of the Decree, it
becomes apparent how drastically the error affected Mr. Chavez's award:
Division of Marital Assets to Dennis Chavez

Bank One
Bank One
Dean Witter IRA
Astro Van
1983 Honda
Motorcycle
Glass Stream Boat
Furniture
Eng. Ring
Loan to Chavez, Inc.
Gallagher Debt
Attorney fee judgment
Judgment to Tamra
re Chavez, Inc.
loan proceeds

Net

Memorandum
Decision
15,961
14,018
163,500
14,080
500
5,800
295
7,750
50,000
(6,572)
(38,713.54)

$226,618.36

Decree
15,961
14,018
163,500
14,080

Admissions
On Appeal
15,961
14,018
163,500
14,080
500
5,800
295
7,750

500
5,800
295
7,750
50,000
(6,572)
(38,713.54)

(6,572)
(38,713.54)

(50.000)

(50.000)

$176,618.36

$126,618.36

—

As demonstrated by the above table, if Dennis were able to liquidate every asset
he received except the IRA, he would still have to liquidate some $36,881 from that
F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.wpd
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IRA, with its attendant tax and penalties, just to meet the order of the court as it now
stands. Dennis would be left with an IRA worth approximately $126,000, subject to
taxes when withdrawn, and no other marital asset. Tamra, on the other hand, receives
values of some $354,898, together with three-quarters of her attorney's fees obligations
paid. Her share of marital property now includes virtually all of the equity in the house,
together with a $50,000 judgment from Dennis.
This disproportionate treatment has yet to be explained by the Petitioner or by
the district court, with the exception of the trial court's misreading of Dunn v. Dunn. 802
P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and an innocuous letter attempting to "save a golden
goose" which has been specifically found by the court to be Dennis' separate property.
In reality, Tamra is sharing that separate property in a number of ways:
a.

from dividends received and contributed during the marriage;

b.

from dividends which were never contributed to the marriage, but which
the court divided without explanation (Bank One account and engagement
ring); and,

c.

from inclusion of all gross dividends in Dennis' projected income for
purposes of alimony calculations.

This is inequitable to Dennis for the reasons expressed here and in Argument V, infra.
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11

ARGUMENT III
DISSIPATION HAS NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED.
In Parker v. Parker. 996 P.2d 565 (2000), the Utah Court of Appeals noted that,
"upon a showing of apparent dissipation" the burden will shift unto the custodian of the
marital funds to demonstrate that it was spent to service or retire marital debt to pay
taxes for which both parties were responsible, to close the gap between income and
reasonably living expenses, or for other marital purposes.
It now appears that neither the trial court nor Petitioner can even identify which
funds they claim existed after separation, which funds they claim are "unaccounted for,"
or what presumptive evidence demonstrates that dissipation is even an issue. Clearly,
the trial court's findings are insufficient because they relate to both the $100,000 receipt
from Chavez, Inc. and the $80,000 Bank One account, about which Dennis has
answered all questions. Nowhere in the Findings does the Court state that Dennis
Chavez failed to account for funds or that dissipation of funds is apparent.
What is apparent is that Petitioner was either purposefully or inadvertently
confused at trial. That confusion is now being intentionally used to justify a $50,000
judgment to Tamra Chavez.
Dennis received from, and then loaned to, Chavez, Inc. $100,000 in 1994 or
1995. He received payment from Chavez, Inc. in 1995 and 1996, during the marriage.
It is agreed that these funds were marital in nature. He deposited these funds in joint
accounts and expended the funds on the building of the parties' home, the purchase of
furnishings for the house, and other general marital purposes.
F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.wpd
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These transactions were all disclosed in Dennis' production of his Dean Witter
checking and saving account records, provided to Petitioner before Dennis' deposition.
Dennis also received dividend distributions from S-Corp., Chavez, Inc., and Del
Rio Corp., both during the marriage and after separation. Even though he claimed, and
the court found, these funds to be non-marital, he also provided copies of all receipts,
all deposits, and all checks written against these funds for the years during marriage
and the years following separation.3
In Parker v. Parker, the court found no explanation for "missing sums of nearly
$100,000 in just six months," including one check for $63,000 where there was
sufficient monthly income to satisfy the parties' needs. In this case, the parties had all
receipts and expenditures of the note receivable proceeds during the marriage, most of
which had been expended by the time of separation on marital assets or obligations.
This is the only evidence that is before the court, in spite of Petitioner's confusion.
Petitioner made incorrect assumptions that the $80,000 Bank One account came
from the $100,000 note receivable proceeds, rather than non-marital dividends
received. Even if it is assumed, however, that the $80,000 account was derived from
the $100,000 loan proceeds, then they are already accounted for and have been
distributed to Petitioner under the Decree of Divorce as follows:
a.

The approximate $16,000 balance divided as marital property;

b.

Repayment of notes to Dennis' father for home improvements;

3

Petitioner's assertion that her counsel's testimony acknowledging receipt of
these documents should be limited to the issue of fees is disingenuous.
F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.wpd
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c.

Payments of attorney's fees for both Petitioner's and Respondent's
counsel;

d.

Purchase of Dennis' engagement ring ($7,500), which the court
improperly included as marital property.

As explained by the court of appeals in Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684, 688
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), because a valuation date is contrary to the general rule that
marital estates are valued as of the date of trial, the trial court must support an alternate
valuation date by subsidiary findings. These findings should specify the accounts and
balances as of the date of separation and at least an initial determination that
Respondent has failed to demonstrate that such funds were or were not expended for
marital debt, taxes, or to meet a deficiency of income over expenses. No such findings
exist in this case. The sole finding is contained in one sentence:
The court finds that Respondent has had the benefit of the $100,000 loan
to Chavez, Inc. and that he should be obligated to pay Petitioner $50,000
as her portion of this asset as reflected in the distribution of assets set
forth above. (R. 740.)
Nowhere does the court even suggest that Dennis dissipated the $100,000 asset, or
that the $100,000 asset exists but was not disclosed. Indeed, all property and all
accounts have been fully disclosed and divided by this Court and all of it, other than the
actual stock certificates themselves, has been treated as marital property. Accordingly,
Tamra has already received her portion of marital property, including whatever may be
left of deposited funds, whether they were marital or non-marital.
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ARGUMENT IV
PETITIONER CANNOT JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT'S
FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE PROMISSORY NOTE AS A MARITAL DEBT.
Respondent's principal argument relies on Finlavson v. Finlavson. 874 P.2d 843
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) for the proposition that a divorce court cannot litigate claims
arising between the divorcing parties and third persons not parties to the divorce action.
Petitioner completely ignores this argument, which equally applies to the Gallagher
debt. Instead, Petitioner relies upon a litany of tangential arguments, none of which are
dispositive of this issue.
1. Petitioner first argues First Natl Bank v. Egbert. 663 P.2d 85 (Utah 1983), for
the proposition that all parties must consent to an extended payment of a promissory
note. In Egbert, however, the obligor was the son and his parents were
accommodation parties as defined in the U.C.C. Clearly the son was not his parents'
agent for the purpose of consenting to an extension of the original note, and of course,
the holding in Egbert was correct in finding that the parents were not obligated under
the original note. In Egbert, all parties were before the court and the court had full
jurisdiction to rule. As previously noted, this Court cannot decide legal issues between
individuals who are not before the Court.
In this case, Tamra testified that Dennis handled all family and business
finances. (R. 889, pp. 336-38.) Dennis was, in fact, the agent for his then wife and
had the right to extend Tamra's joint obligation under the promissory note. She too
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benefitted from this extension. See Macris v. Sculptured Software. Inc., 24 P.3d 984
(2001) (husband is wife's agent).
2. Next, Petitioner chides Dennis for his use of the term "moral" in describing his
obligation to reimburse his parents. In this sense, Dennis uses that term as a synonym
for "ethical" or "equitable." A divorce court is a court of equity. Is Dennis not equitably
compelled to repay a father that gave him a job and career, bailed him (and her) out of
significant business failures, gifted him stock, and loaned him money for homes and
home improvements? Could he ever say, "sorry you didn't sue me in time?" Clearly
Dennis has an ethical, an equitable, and a moral obligation to reimburse his parents for
a legitimate debt upon which the parties had made partial payment, and which both
testified would have been due but for a statutory bar. That statutory bar, if there is one,
should be litigated between the makers and holders of the note.
Petitioner alludes to the court's reiteration of a suggestion of "mere coincidence,
a scenario of possible orchestration intimidated by Petitioner." Clearly this statement is
not a finding of fact. It is not even a suggestion. It simply reflects the Petitioner's
speculation or intimidation. Nowhere does the court elevate this statement to a finding
strong enough to divest Petitioner of joint responsibility. In fact, nowhere does the court
deal with the prospect that Dennis, in equity, must pay that obligation back to his
parents.
3. Petitioner then speculates that it would not have been acceptable to Dennis
for the court to award Tamra sufficient marital assets in order to pay off Dennis' portion
of that promissory note. In fact, that is exactly what Dennis would agree to, and what
F:\USERS\RDS\Chavez\Pleadings\reply.brief.wpd
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should occur. Since Tamra received two-thirds of all marital property and all of the
value of the home, she should be held responsible for the promissory note which made
possible the acquisition of that house, the parties5 largest asset.
4. Petitioner next attempts to escape responsibility by alleging estoppel.
Estoppel should not apply where Tamra constructively and actually allowed Dennis to
handle the family and business finances on her behalf. If anything, she should be
estopped from claiming a statutory bar.
5. Public Policy: Finally, Petitioner argues that Dennis Chavez must first admit
the promissory note obligation is a gift if his public policy arguments related to parental
gifting are credible. Dennis asks the court to view his parents' other gifts to him and to
his other siblings as being protected by a public policy that encourages these gifts and
their treatment as non-marital property. At the same time, the trial court should not
impose a gift that was never intended by his parents to be a gift. Tony Chavez testified
he attempted to treat his children equally, but not necessarily with the same properties.
If his estate planning justifies gifts of stock in certain family businesses, it does not
follow that either parent would necessarily forgive loans evidenced by promissory notes.
ARGUMENT V
A DISPROPORTIONATE DIVISION OF
MARITAL PROPERTY IS NOT JUSTIFIED.
Petitioner agrees: "there are untold legitimate ways to transfer property to
children and protect it from a claim of a divorcing spouse." Yet those legitimate
transfers failed in this case. The trial court recognized the separate gifted character of
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the donations to Dennis but then takes the value of these gifts away from Dennis and
the intent of his parents, by using the gifts as a reason to disproportionately divide the
remaining marital property and by failing to recognize the income received from these
gifts as Dennis' separate property. These non-marital gifts alone should not be
considered sufficient to support a disproportionate division of marital property.
Otherwise, all spouses will have a claim to non-marital property just because of their
marriage relationship. That was never intended by the court. See Dunn v. Dunn. 802
P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Petitioner recites the trial court's letter after denying Respondent's request for a
hearing, saying in effect that the court attempted to preserve the goose that laid the
golden egg. (R. 702-03.) While it is not clear, the trial judge seems to refer to income
streams necessary to preserve lifestyles, but specifically refers to Chavez, Inc.
Curiously, the court had found that Dennis only worked for Chavez, Inc., and that
Chavez, Inc. is separately controlled by Dennis' father Tony Chavez, and that Dennis'
ownership interest was a gifted, non-marital property. Now Petitioner justifies the
court's reasoning that the Petitioner should receive an unequal proportion of marital
property simply because he sustained the separate character of stock ownership held
under Dennis' name in the family corporation. This circuitous argument belies common
sense. The court did not, nor should it have added any gifted stock to the marital
estate. Petitioner's reliance upon a letter of explanation from the court enforces Dennis'
argument. The court made no finding, it simply wrote a letter.
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ARGUMENT VI
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND S CORP.
TO BE NON-MARITAL PROPERTY.
A.

Petitioner's Failure to Marshal Evidence.

Petitioner has failed in her duty to properly martial the evidence in the record
which the trial court could have used to support its findings and conclusions that the
stock of S Corp. was a gift to Dennis not a marital purchase.
Petitioner says the only evidence which could be used is the testimony of Dennis
and his father. The Petitioner's brief then refers to page citations in the transcript
without citing the nature of the testimony given or why it is deemed insufficient to
support Judge Uno's findings of fact that the stock of S Corp. was gifted to Dennis by
his parents.
More importantly, however, Petitioner did not do a very exhaustive search for
additional evidence in the record or the findings. If the Appellee fails to properly
marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes the record supports the finding.
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Additional evidence
includes, for example: Tamra's affidavit, signed under oath, states that the stock was
gifted to Dennis by his father. (Pleadings, R. 173.) Tamra's own testimony that she
believed it was a gift, but that it was a gift to both parties rather than one party. The
stock certificate (Ex. 59) evidencing a transfer of this interest to Dennis only. The S
Company Buy-Sell Agreement (Finding 10b and R. 889, p. 314), which limits holders of
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S Company stock to original family members, not spouses. The existence of S
Company stock in other siblings names. (R. 889, pp. 202-03.)
Petitioner relies upon Dennis' failed attempt to satisfy the joint promissory note to
his parents by agreeing with his father's demand to transfer the gifted stock in S
Corporation as full satisfaction for what was owed by the parties under the promissory
note. While those demands were not written very artfully, and while they may be
subject to various interpretations, the trial court found, after hearing testimony from
Tony Chavez and all other parties, the writings were consistent with Tony Chavez's
testimony and intent.
The only other piece of evidence is the signed stipulation between the parties
which Dennis' original counsel prepared without fully understanding the origins of
Dennis' S Corp. stock holdings. As explained by Dennis at trial, since he was
attempting to settle this matter and resolve the parties' differences, he did not concern
himself with correcting characterizations in that stipulation. He was only concerned with
pursuing the settlement and the entry of an appropriate decree of divorce. The property
was to have been awarded to him whether it was characterized as marital or nonmarital. Once that settlement was set aside, Dennis quickly let all parties know the true
nature of his holdings, including a full disclosure of that issue in his deposition. (Dep.
p. 55.)
Finally, Petitioner claims that it would be inequitable not to include the value of S
Corp. in the marital estate. Dennis counters that it is inequitable for the court to have
recognized all of the prior income stream as his separate property and then divide it
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without explanation, as though it was marital. Dennis expended much of his dividends
on marital property and agreed they should be treated as such by the Court. However,
Dennis treated a great deal as his own property, as the court found, yet the court failed
to recognize its separate character. Instead, the court included virtually all existing
accounts and existing properties, other than the specific corporate interests as marital.
Dennis is now left with gifted interests for which he receives no positive cash flow. The
inequity, if any, is that Dennis is left with non-producing assets which represent a drain
to his future income, while the Petitioner has been given a substantially
disproportionate amount of marital property in consideration of the fact that Dennis was
awarded assets gifted by his parents that he cannot sell, he cannot reduce to income or
cash flow, and that represent a current drain on his ability to support himself and his
family.
Clearly, Plaintiff has failed in her obligation to exhaustively marshal the evidence,
and she has failed to demonstrate to the Court why the trial court's reliance upon
evidence in favor of the trial court's finding on this issue is insufficient or should be
overturned.
VII.

ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED.

Tamra should not be awarded her fees, either on appeal or at the district court
level, and the entire question of attorney's fees and costs of court should be remanded
back to the trial court for further disposition, consistent with the positions taken by
Respondent in this appeal.
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VIII. CONCLUSION.
As stated by Respondent in his original brief, many of the errors alleged to have
occurred at the trial court level affected a number of Respondent's issues. Now that the
Petitioner agrees that there was no receivable due from Chavez, Inc., Petitioner will
also have to agree that an award of one-half of that non-existent asset to Dennis should
no longer be included in Dennis' share of marital property. Nor should Respondent be
required to pay Petitioner her portion of the non-existent asset.
The trial court inequitably divided the marital estate and the debts associated
with the acquisition of marital property, without making findings sufficient to analyze why
these amounts are justified. On these issues and the resulting judgments for $50,000
and for attorney's fees, the findings are neither sufficiently detailed nor include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached.
The issues raised by Appellant should be vacated and remanded to the district court for
proper consideration.
DATED this

28TH

day of December, 2001.

By:
foog^t). SandackVE^ijq.
Attorney for Respclnde
Respdrfdent/Appellant
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B.L. Dart, Esq.
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Attorneys for Petitioner
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HAND DELIVERED
Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Senior Third District Court Judge
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Chavez v. Chavez - Civil No. 974900264DA

Dear Judge Uno:
During the cross examination of my client, Dennis Chavez, Mr. Dart asked why
he had not listed the promissory note as an obligation under Interrogatory No. 7 in his
Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories dated July 2, 1998.
Mr. Chavez did not have a recollection or reason expressed at that time. As we
were leaving the courtroom, he realized the reason the promissory note obligation had
not been listed was because of the contract he had with his father dated April 2, 1997,
and introduced as Exhibit 65, wherein he had sold back the Swanson stock to his father
to pay off the note. The Interrogatories were answered on July 2, 1998 and the return
of the Swanson stock and the reassertion of the promissory note liability did not occur
until after the letter dated July 17, 1998 from Dennis' father was received. This was
introduced as Exhibit 66 which did not show the date, however, attached hereto is a
copy showing that it was signed on July 17, 1998.
Bert Dart has stipulated that I could send this letter to bring this fact to the court's
attention. It does not constitute an acknowledgment on his part that the promissory
note had, in fact, been paid with the sale of the Swanson stock as it is his position that
the Swanson stock never was sold under the Exhibit 65 agreement and that he
continued receipt by Dennis of dividends from Swanson during all of 1997 and 1998, as
evidenced by Exhibit 69, show that Dennis continued to own the stock which could not
have then been used to pay off the promissory note.

Honorable Raymond S. Uno
July 20, 2000
Page 2

This letter has been written with the prior approval and graciousness of Bert Dart
who stipulated to amend the record for this limited purpose.
Very truly yours,

ger D. Sanclack
RDS/ljc
cc:

B.L. Dart, Esq.
(via fax)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,

2

STATE OF UTAH

3
4

* * * * * * * *

TAMRA ANNE CHAVEZ,
U?

5
6
7

Petitioner,

Civil No. 9749002^4DA

vs.
Hon. Anne M. Stirba
Commissioner Evans

DENNIS M. CHAVEZ,

8

Respondent.

9

* * * * * * * *

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

DEPOSITION OF DENNIS M. CHAVEZ, a witness produced,
sworn and examined on Wednesday, the 2nd day of June, in
the year of our Lord 1999, between the hours of 1:00 p.m.
and 4:20 p.m. of that day, in the small Conference Room of
the Law Office of B.L. Dart, 310 So. Main Street, Suite
1330, in the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake and
State of Utah, before me, Alan P. Smith, Certified
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for said
State of Utah, in a certain cause now pending in the
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein
Tamra Anne Chavez is the Petitioner and Dennis M. Chavez
is the Respondent, on the part of the Petitioner.

IT

A P P E A R A N C E S :

18
19

For the Petitioner:

B.L. Dart
Dart, Adamson, Donovan &
Hanson
310 So. Main St., Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

For the Respondent:

Roger Sandack
170 So. Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Also present:

Jennifer Olson
Tamra Anne Chavez

20
21
22
23
24
25

mn

ALAN P SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107

1 I involved in the construction business, which would be
2

1989.

3

Q

Dropping back, there was a distortion there

4

because of some Nordstrom income apparently of Tamee's of

5

$387*

Chavez, Inc., W-2 was $236,353.

6
7

When the company paid you the money back, what
did you do with it?

8

A

I paid taxes on it.

9

Q

And did that use it all or did you still have

11

A

I had some and I loaned it to the company.

12

Q

Thereafter then you loaned it to the company in

10

some?

13

the form of $100,000, and thereafter it appears that in

14

1994 they paid you back $75,000 of that.

15

A

I believe so.

16

Q

Do you know what happened to the $75,000?

17

A

I don't know.

18

Q

And after 1996, the books indicate, don't show

19

any further payable so I assume that you were paid the

20

$25,000 as well.

21

A

That is my recollection.

22

Q

And do you know where that $25,000 is?

23

A

I don't.

24
25 J

MR. DART:

I'm going to mark these as

exhibits, and during the recess we will make multiple
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1 I copies so everybody can have one.
2

MR. SANDACK:

3

don't we take a recess now.

4
5

MR. DART:

Is that all right?

That is fine.

In fact why

That's good.

(Short recess).

6

(Thereupon deposition Exhibits

7

11, 12, and 13 were marked for

8

identification).

9

MR. DART:

Back on the record.

10

Let me do this first, then you can.

11

marked Exhibit 11, the 1995 joint individual tax returns

12

for Dennis and Tamee Chavez that we previously talked to.

13

We have also marked Exhibit 12, the 1996 year-

14

end Chavez, Inc. balance sheet.

15

reverse order.

16
17

We have now

I am sorry, they are in

That's okay.

Exhibit 13 is the year-end 1995 Chavez, Inc.
balance sheet.

18

Q

19

statement?

20

A

(By Mr. Dart)

Yes.

And if you wanted to make some

I need to clarify time has permitted me to

21

remember a response to your question as to where that

22

money went to.

23
24

At that time we purchased a home or purchased
property in Draper and built a home.

All the cash that

25 I was returned from Chavez, Inc. to me went into the
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1

purchase of the property and building of a home and

2

remains now equity in the property.

3

Q

That is the home currently occupied by Tamee?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Okay.

In Draper at 1177 Bear Hollow Circle.
In the documentation which you provided

6

for us there is a charge card, Visa charge card that is a

7

Chavez, Inc., card, as I understand it, and it has been

8

used as I understand by you and these are charges made by

9

you.

10

A

Yes.

May not be completely by me as it is a

11

corporate card.

12

utilize where possible.

13
14
15

Q

I give it to some of my employees to

So this is, there is only one card and you make

it available to other employees?
A

No.

Some employees have access to a card,

16

others do not.

17

tell me, "Hey, give me your Visa card and I will use it."

18

Q

When they go to pick something up they

Okay.

I am seeing an entry, and I have not made

19

copies of this, I can if you want, one is to a J.M. Linne

20

Company for $1,692.

Do you know what that is?

21

A

Can I see it, please?

22

Q

Sorry.

23

A

Yes.

24
25

That is a supplier of vinyl for uniwall

product.
Q

There is a Cabo San Lucas, Mexico hotel charge.

42

that.
MR. SANDACK:
MR. DART:

—

portion.

I agree.

MR. SANDACK:

So can we keep this portion

of the deposition confidential —
MR. DART: Yes.
MR. SANDACK:
want to handle it.
Q

—

or sealed or however you

Thank you.

(By Mr. Dart)

Have they replaced it with

another product?
A

They have attempted to, yes.

Q

What is your dad's association with Mr. Swanson?

A

A contemporary, very good friend and a business

partner.
Q

In connection with Swanson.

A

That is correct.

Q

You own stock in Swanson, is that right?

A

I was gifted stock in Swanson.

Q

In some of your pleadings you talk about buying

stock from Swanson.
happened.
A

I guess I need to know exactly what

When and what happened?
Well, my father came to me one day and said,

"Hank, I and Ashworth and Daws are going to form a
company.
Q

I am going to give you stock in it."
Wasn't the arrangement he was going to sell you
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1

the stock?

2

A

No.

3

Q

And that was never the arrangement?

4

A

No.

5

Q

And were you issued a stock certificate?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

And whose name is that certificate in?

8

A

In Dennis M. Chavez.

9

Q

Do you know when that was issued?

10

A

I don't.

11

Q

Do you have a copy of that?

12

A

I don't have one in front of me.

13

one to •—

14

MR. SANDACK:

15

MR. DART:

MR. DART:

17

19

We gave you one.

Off the record.

(Off the record).

16

18

I have given

here.
Q

Cool.

I am glad Jennifer is

She just saved thirty minutes.
(By Mr. Dart)

You produced in response to

20

request for production a number of documents, and I have

21

just simply put them together although I don't know that

22

they coordinate time wise, but I just made a packet and we

23

will go through the packet.

24

MR. SANDACK:

Twenty.

25
56

1

What that was for was my father had allowed us

2

to make improvements on the home in Dimple Dell, which I

3

identified in a letter toTamee through her attorney, or

4

through my attorney to her attorney, indicating there is

5

an obligation for repairs and build-up and improvements on

6

the Dimple Dell home in the amount of approximately

7

$33,000, and I think the balance, or the $35,000 we called

8

good based on interest.

9
10

Q

So your attorney was Eph Fankhauser at that time

corresponding with John Anderson at that time.

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And this they send to improvements in Dimple

13

Dell.

14

Dimple Dell?

15

Why do you pay your dad back on improvements to

A

Because the money, or the resources, the

16

materials, the labor, were funded by Chavez, Inc., which

17

was the company he owned at that time.

18

Q

You're telling me that is on top of the loan

19

that we have been talking about and the interest on that

20

loan?

21
22
23

A

That is correct.

And Tamee refused to recognize

that obligation at all.
Q

In June of '98 you wrote a check for, 260 to

24

Lori Christian for $15,000.

25

correct?

That is your finance, is that
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1

A

That is correct.

2

Q

And what was that for?

3

A

That was for costs of living there, vacation she

4

had paid for.

5
6

She wasn't at the time.

Q

What would —

did you arrive at a figure of what

it costs you a month to live there?

7

A

Yeah, we did.

Splitting expenses.

8

Q

What was that?

9

A

Approximately $1500.

10

Q

Is it ten months living expenses there?

11

A

Approximately.

Less than that.

12

expenses that she paid for for trips.

13

purchased for my children.

There were some

Things that she had

14

Q

Did she give you an accounting of any of that?

15

A

I kept the accounting myself.

16

Q

Do you have that still?

17

A

I don't know if I do.

Q

You have a check, 259, the check before that is

18
19

If I do I will produce

it.

20

to Roger Sandack, $15,000 retainer.

21

to this divorce case.

I assume that relates

22

A

That is correct.

23

Q

Have you paid him any other fees on this case?

24

A

Not to date.

25

Q

So this account is not a regular checking
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1

account, but it is just one where the dividends go and

2

that you made special payments out of?

3

A

Well, that is not entirely true.

Since the

4

beginning of the, since my agreement with Tamee to pay for

5

various aspects, I have pooled all of my monies and

6

resources into the account at Bank One, which is a

7

checking account,

8
9

Originally I had two separate accounts at Dean
Witter.

One was to keep the dividends separate from the

10

other, since that was my money.

11

to Bank One for convenience purposes.

12
13

Q

I then transferred money

And the money you transferred to Bank One is out

of the Dean Witter account.

14

A

That is correct.

15

Q

Was that a joint account with Tamee?

16

A

No, that was a private account.

17

Q

I have gotten confused now.

You have an IRA

18

account at Dean Witter; you have another account at Dean

19

Witter which we have looked at, which you indicate has a

20

balance of around $150 or so.

Was there a third account?

21

A

Yes, there was.

22

Q

And that account has been closed?

23

A

That account was closed after, after the divorce

24
25

proceedings began, because it was a joint account.
Q

And the money moved from that Dean Witter
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1

A

That would be Mike's.

2

Q

Mike's jewelry, $7,750.

3

Is that —

well, what

is that for?

4

A

Engagement ring.

5

Q

Have you told your children that you are going

6

to be buying a country club membership for your finance?

7

A

No.

8

Q

Are you going to be doing that?

9

A

No.

10

Q

Have you thought about it or discussed doing

12

A

I don't understand what you mean.

13

Q

So there is not, you're not looking to buy a

11

that?

14

country club membership or haven't talked about buying a

15

country club membership.

16

A

17
18

MR. SANDACK:

THE WITNESS:
club

23

I don't know what country

—

21
22

Are you talking about the

Salt Lake Country Club, counselor?

19
20

I have one.

MR. DART:
Q

(By Mr. Dart)

No.
The country club membership you

have you tell me is Chavez, Inc., in your name.

24

A

That is correct.

25

Q

Are you contemplating buying another membership
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anywhere?
A

No.

Q

In addition to this checking account you had a

savings account, is that right?
A

That is correct.

Q

And I've got a recap here that has been created.

I am not going to hold you to the accuracy of it but it
will save me going through accounts, and if it refreshes
your memory it will be sufficient.
MR. SANDACK:
MR. DART:

This will be Exhibit 33?

Um-um.
(Thereupon deposition Exhibit No.
33 was marked for identification)

Q

(By Mr. Dart)

This appeared to have about

$80,000 in early 1997, is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And was that, what was the source of that money?

A

The money that I received from dividends that I

testified earlier that I transferred from Dean Witter.
Q

And then June you pulled out $10,000, is that

right?
A

That is correct.

Q

Do you know where that money went?

A

Yeah.

Q

Was that friend your fiance?

That went to a loan to a friend.
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1

A

No.

2i

Q

Okay.

3

And do you still have a loan receivable

from that friend?

4

A

No, that money was put into the Dean Witter

5

account to pay for obligations that I had as a result of

6

this divorce.
Q

7
8

You loaned the money here out of this account,

when he paid you back you put it in Dean Witter.

9

A

That is correct.

10

Q

Was it a one payment back, one $10,000 payment?

11

A

One $10,000, plus interest.

12

Q

About how long ago did you receive that, or how

13

long was the loan outstanding?

14

A

I think it was a year loan.

15

Q

Okay.

16

got it back.

17

A

18
19

So probably been the summer of '98 you

That is correct.

leaving to go out of town.
Q

It was prior to my friend
To move anyway.

And then in June of 1998 you pull out $55,000

20

and you put that into the personal account we are talking

21

about, is that right?

22
23
24
25

A

That is correct.

To cover the drafts against

that.
Q

And that would have been your dad's $35,000,

Roger's $15,000 and about $5,000 for me at that time, is
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1

that right?

2

A

That is correct.

3

MR. DART:

4

THE WITNESS:

5
6

Q

(By Mr. Dart)

Thirty three?
That is correct.

Do you have any other bank

accounts?

7

A

No.

8

Q

So a total of three Dean Witter, one of which is

9
10

closed, two of which are still open, and a savings account
and a checking account.

11

A

Bank One.

12

Q

Or Bank One.

13

A

That is all I have.

14

Q

on interrogatory No. 6 concerning assets owned

15

by you, there is an objection to the interrogatory, but

16

then stating that you without objection will attach a list

17

of assets.

18

there was an attachment at that time?

-I9

Do you know whether

I will take an answer from anybody.

20
21

We had no attachments.

MR. SANDACK:

I don't have my file with me.

I will have to take a look and see.

22

MR. DART:

We got no attachments to this,

23

so we would request the attachment referenced in answer to

24

No. 6 .

25

MR. SANDACK:

Okay.
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